Polarized Cherokee Politics in “Blood Moon”

Outgrowing schoolbook understandings is a lifelong endeavor.  We were all taught the injustice of the Trail of Tears, but there is more to the story.  How many of us grow up to examine its complexities?  With the arrival of John Sedgwick’s Blood Moon a fuller understanding is one exciting read away.

Jackson is the villain of the schoolbook story, but Sedgwick makes him into a round character.  Old Hickory valued strength, both in himself and in the Indians with which he treated.  True, he made promises he did not keep–most notoriously with the Cherokee who supported him in the Creek War–yet other times he spoke forthrightly and sympathetically.   When Jackson made The Ridge into a (symbolic) major in the army, the Cherokee leader was so proud he affixed the title to his name ever afterwards.  His son, John Ridge, went so far as to name his second son Andrew Jackson Ridge.

This obsequiousness may not be surprising, coming from the Ridges, leaders of the accommodationist faction of the Cherokee, the Treaty Party.  The Ridges foresaw that life as they had known it had no future in the East.  To remain a sovereign people, the Treaty Party believed, the Cherokee would need to relocate in land set aside west of the Mississippi.  In truth, life as they knew it had been changing fast for decades.  In a single generation, the Ridges and their ilk had become upwardly mobile farmers, exchanging the bow-and-arrow for the plow.  They had begun dressing in European clothes and, some of them, purchasing African slaves.  (Major Ridge owned thirty on his $24,000 plantation.)  Many (though not Major Ridge) adopted Christian beliefs and practices.  Sequoyah‘s invention of a Cherokee syllabary led to a flowering of Cherokee writing in a single decade, the 1820s, which included the drafting of a constitution, the publication of a Cherokee newspaper, and the opening of at least a dozen new schools.  It is no surprise that the Cherokee earned the moniker of “civilized tribe,” European Americans’ highest praise.

If the Ridge Party represented a kind of striving middle class within of mixed-blood Cherokee, then the much larger Cherokee faction of full-bloods, still speaking Cherokee and living (as much as possible) according to tradition, was represented by John Ross.  Oddly and ironically, Ross looked more like a Scots gentleman than a principal chief, as he soon became.  (Seven of his eight great-grandparents were of pure Scots extraction.)  Ross spoke only English, almost no Cherokee.  But it was Ross, somehow, who spoke to the Cherokees’ deepest longings of remaining in the land of their birth and of maintaining the old ways of the hunt and the tribal council.  (This was not unlike the billionaire, Donald Trump, “speaking the language” of dispossessed, white lower middle class voters with whom he otherwise shares very little).

The political disagreements between the Ridge and the Ross Parties turned into a factional feud with vendettas and violence in abundance.  It persisted for the full lifespans of their namesakes and beyond.  After Removal became an accomplished fact, Ross supporters assassinated three of four main Ridge leaders, including the Major, himself.  Reprisal succeeded reprisal, and the struggle for political control of the People heated to the boiling point.  In 1845, 34 murders gave the Territory a murder rate ten times greater than Chicago’s deadly 2017 rate.  Weariness of bloodshed–along with a few other contingencies that Sedgwick enumerates–led the two parties, at last, to lay down their arms and agree to work together.  John Ross and John Ridge stood on the same stage and shook hands.

The peace didn’t last.  Sedgwick documents how “income inequality” (and, just as much, wealth inequality) exacerbated the political rifts.  Treaty Party members and their newfound Old Settler allies were much more likely to be prosperous landowners, much more likely to be slave owners.  The issue of slavery was driving a wedge down the middle of the entire American nation.  Once again, the Cherokee would be torn in two.  (The Revolutionary War had split the Cherokee, too, even before the rivalry of Ross and Ridge.)  Ross, who had been elected principal chief by a strong but tenuous majority, hedged his bets as long as he could.  Under pressure to act, he threw his lot with the Union, then quickly shifted to the Confederacy.

The war took a disproportionate toll on the Cherokee.  Sedgwick tells us the war resulted in the deaths (of battle, disease, and starvation) of one-quarter of the Cherokee population.  A third of all wives were widowed.  A quarter of all children were orphaned.  By siding with the Rebels–first the Ridge Party, then the Rosses–the Cherokee had given the federal government the freedom to abrogate its treaty obligations with a clean conscience.  The New Echota Treaty of 1935, in which the Ridges had placed so much faith, was null and void.  It had merely delayed the inevitable, in any case.

Who would control the Cherokee Territory in war’s aftermath?  The Ridge Party rallied around Confederate hero Stand Watie.  John Ross, the octogenarian, clung to his claim on leadership from his deathbed: “I am an old man and have served my people and the government of the United States a long time….  My people have kept me in the harness, not of my own seeking, but of their own choice.”  Ross had the votes, so the Ridges (not for the first time) talked of dividing the Territory in two.  Johnson, federal officials, and the courts were in no mood to accede to a states’ rights type argument.  As Sedgwick says, they were not about to “save one union only to dissolve another.”

In his concluding chapters, Sedgwick critiques the leaders of both factions evenhandedly.  Ross should have listened better, been more realistic and less politically opportunistic.  The various Ridge leaders should have done more to understand the resistance to removal and worked to overcome it.  In his most direct summation, Sedgwick explains, “Everyone is self-interested, and politics is the art by which everyone’s self-interest can be fairly served.  It is the market system for distributing whatever benefits government can dispense.”

Those two sentences grabbed me.  The Cherokee story in its totality struck me as immediately relevant to our current situation.  Democrats and Republicans are increasingly turning policy disagreements into all-or-nothing issues of personal virtue and patriotism.  Last week, Donald Trump called the effort to block the Kavanaugh nomination “a disgraceful situation brought about by evil people.”  Hillary Clinton decided that civility was no longer tenable “with a political party that wants to destroy what you stand for, what you care about.”  There is no wiggle room for compromise with either utterance.  There is no room, even, for coexistence.

Major Ridge didn’t survive to reflect back on his legacy, but John Ross did.  In his deathbed oration, he declared pride in his fifty years of service to “his” people.  “Now I look back,” he said, “not one act of my public life rises up to upbraid me.  I have done the best I could, and today upon this bed of sickness, my heart approves all I have done.  And still I am John Ross, the same John Ross of former years.  Unchanged!  No cause to change!”  Such an astounding lack of humility and self-awareness!  Such a blindness to the virtues of learning and flexibility.  Is it too much to ask that today’s leaders show these traits that Ross so patently lacked?

Probably.

Source:  Sedgwick, John.  Blood Moon: An American Epic of War and Splendor in the Cherokee Nation.  New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018.

Images: Wikimedia Commons

The Cherokee story has been told before in Robert Conley‘s The Cherokee Nation: A History (2005), which has the virtue of starting the tale earlier, as far back as the record can account for.  However, Sedgwick’s account is told more vividly and perhaps in a more balanced way.  Conley emphasizes the Treaty Party’s lack of authority to sign a treaty in 1935.  Sedgwick emphasizes Ross’s willful myopia in resisting removal, while, ultimately, finding fault on both sides.

 

German Propaganda Addresses African American Soldiers

posted in: WWI Nurses | 0

As 1918 progressed and the Allies gained new strength with the arrival of American troops, Fritz grew desperate.  He dropped propaganda leaflets from the air onto American positions, hoping to sow doubt among this freshest enemy:

“To the Colored Soldiers of the US Army: Hello boys, what are you doing over here?  Fighting the Germans?  Why?”

They had been told that it was “for the sake of humanity and Democracy.”  But what is Democracy, the leaflets asked, if not personal freedom and equal rights before the law.  “Do you enjoy the same rights as white people do in America, the land of freedom and Democracy[?]  Can you get into a restaurant where white people dine?  Can you get a seat in a theatre where white people sit?”

The leaflets spouted a few Marxist shibboleths and scolded the intended readers for being “fools if you allow people to make you hate us,” and ” to use you as cannon fodder.”  But they ended with a friendly invitation: “Come over [to Germany] and see for yourself.”

There is no evidence any soldiers took up the offer.  Nor is there evidence that the Germans put much effort into this campaign.

“Colored” American soldiers stuck with their country through the deadly Meuse-Argonne offensive, up to armistice and beyond.  But when the Allies celebrated their victory the next summer, U.S. Army brass did not allow segregated black units to even march down the Champs Elysees with their white compatriots.

There were plenty of things the Germans misjudged or got flat wrong in the catastrophe that was the First World War.  Calling out American hypocrisy was not one of them.

Sources:

Hunton, Addie W. and Johnson, Kathryn M.  Two Colored Women with the American Expeditionary Forces.  London: G. K. Hall & Co., 1997.

Bryan, Jami L.  “Fighting for Respect: African-American Soldiers in WWI.” (2018) https://www.military.com/history/fighting-for-respect-african-american-soldiers-wwi.html.  

Jan Sherbin Leaves Us All Too Soon

posted in: Personal | 0

Jan had an appealing, occasionally disarming, frankness.  She told it like it was.  She didn’t care for sports stories or teen romance, and didn’t mind saying so.

In critique sessions, no detail was too small to escape her notice.  She noticed problems that the many of us missed or ignored.  When I stressed Mary Borden’s diminutive stature, she pointed out that, at 5 feet 6 inches, Borden was hardly petite, especially in 1916.  When I couldn’t account for the name of the Columbus Driving Park in my Rickenbacker chapter, she took the matter in her own hands.  She went home–somehow remembering the question–Googled it, and passed on what she found.

The most important part of this discussion of Jan’s strengths as a critiquer was her openness–passion, even–for getting her own writing critiqued.  Every month she wanted as much critical feedback as she could possibly get.  Bring it on! was her operative mode.  On those nights when I left early and she shared late, she felt gypped that she would have one fewer set of eyes to gaze on her work.  I would take the MS home, or ask her to send it to me, and give her feedback by email.  She was highly appreciative.

In her last email to me, just a few weeks ago, Jan told me that she had, at long last, read my Bunion Derby book.  She admitted that she had put it off for a year and more, not being especially interested in the topic.  But she was pleasantly surprised, and gave me high praise for making my narrative more than just a “sports book.”  I will treasure her commendation, but it is no compensation for the loss of her presence every month in our group–the loss of a sharp mind, a forceful personality, and a reliable friend.  Alas,

Good bye, Jan.  I will miss you.

Balloon Busting at Meuse-Argonne

posted in: Eddie Rickenbacker | 0

On D-Day, September 26, 1918, Allied artillery shelled enemy trenches, beginning at Zero Hour, 4:00 am.  Infantry units went “over the top” an hour and a half later, crossed No Man’s Land and attempted to take those same trenches.

Zero Hour for aviation squadrons came at 5:20 am, giving them just enough time to reach their targets at twilight.  Their targets?  Observation balloons, affectionately known by the Germans as Drachen, “dragons,” and by the French as sauçisses, “sausages”–big, fat German ones, roughly two hundred feet long and fifty feet in diameter.

Observation balloons were tethered on wires to motor trucks, and raised or lowered as needed by gas-powered winches.  Fifteen hundred to 2,000 feet in the air, observers in the Drachen‘s dangling basket could see as much as eight miles into enemy territory, observing the accuracy–and inaccuracy–of their artillery’s guns.  Communicating with the ground over telephone wires, they helped adjust the aim of their guns in real time.

On D-Day, newly assigned captain of the 94th Squadron Eddie Rickenbacker selected five men to accompany him in the attack of two selected Drachen, three to each balloon.  Captain Eddie pulled up the rear.  Flying over Verdun in the early morning darkness, he was awed by the line of artillery fire stretching in an unbroken line to the west, like a “giant switchboard,” he wrote, emitting “thousands of electric flashes as invisible hands manipulated the plugs.”

Rickenbacker followed the Meuse downstream, north, on a trail as familiar as “the path around the corner of my old home.”  He knew at just which bend in the river to bear left to find his Drachen.  His men rendered the over-sized gas-bags into balls of flame even before he had reached them.  So he flew on to Damvillers where he knew of another observation balloon for the taking.

Again, he was beaten to the punch, this time by an unknown compatriot in another squadron.  Before he could make his next move, an enemy aeroplane hove into view.  Rickenbacker confronted the oncoming machine, and the two exchanged spurts of bullets before pulling out, unhit, apparently.  In the second pass, Rickenbacker gained the upper hand and sent the Fokker spinning to the ground.

Before Captain Eddie could enjoy the full taste of victory, he felt a “sudden ugly jerk” in his motor.  He shifted the throttle down to reduce the pounding and the vibration.  He imagined the worst: for him, falling behind enemy lines and being taken prisoner.  Not for the first time, luck shined on Eddie.  He reached the Rembercourt Aerodrome without incident.

On the ground, Eddie discovered that one blade of his propeller was missing.  It must have been hit in the exchange and broken off only after the enemy plane had fallen.  Lucky Eddie had flown home with half a propeller!  Despite his squadron’s successes in the air, troops on the ground were slowed by stiff German resistance and a “brutal tangle of crisscrossed ravines.”  It would take American Expeditionary Forces a full month to push through the Argonne Forest at the cost of 120,000 casualties.  During that month and more, Eddie would shoot fifteen German aircraft out of the air–including four Drachen.

Sources: